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Abstract
This paper explores optimality of contracts and incentives when the principal (pub-
lic organisation) can undertake investments to change agents’ (public workers) identity.
In the model, workers within the organisation can have different identities. We develop
a principal-agent dynamical model with moral hazard, which captures the possibility
of affecting this workers’ identity through contracts offered by the firm. In the model,
identity is a motivation source which reduces agents’ disutility from effort.
We use the term identity to refer to a situation in which the worker shares the
organisational objectives and views herself as a part of the organisation. Contrary, we
use the term conflict to refer to a situation in which workers behave self-interested and
frequently in the opposite way of the organisation. We assume that identity can be
achieved when principal include mission-sense developing investments in contracts. By
mission we mean a single culture that is shared by all the members of an organization.
We discuss the conditions under which spending resources in changing workers’
identity and invest in this kind of motivational capital is optimal for organisations.
Our results may help to inform public firms’ managers about the optimal design of
incentive schemes and policies. For instance, we conclude that investing in motivational
capital is the best option in the long run whereas pure monetary incentives works better
in the short run.
Keywords: contracts, moral hazard, identity, socialization, mission, motivational capital.
JEL Codes: D03, D86.
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1 Introduction
The present work deals with the economic effects of public workers’ identity. Is workers’
identity another productive asset of public organisations? How should public organisations’
managers design incentive schemes in order to benefit from thisMotivational Capital? Could
identity be the key to avoid shirking in public organisations?
The motivation of workers at the public sector has been an issue in the recent economic
literature1. Privately owned competitive firms do not performance optimally when the good
that have to be supplied is a collective good such as education, health, civil and social safety,
a common pool resource or a public good. In the provision of these collective goods the role
played by competition and the optimal incentives may differ from the private competitive
provision of them.
Organizations that provide collective goods pursue goals and objectives, which are not
necessarily monetary profitable, and the motivation of the employees who work within these
organizations goes beyond the expected monetary gain. People who work in the provision
of collective goods sector are generally agents who have a strong self-view as a pro-social
agents. They share organisational goals and objectives and thus joint with organisations
and the managers they cohere in what Wilson [31] called mission.
Akerlof and Kranton [1] consider this sharing-goals behaviour of agents as Identity. In
their words, identity, is “a way to motivate employees, different than incentives from mon-
etary compensation” and also believe that “[. . . ] a change in identity is the ideal motivator
if, [. . . ] the effort of a worker is either hard to observe or hard to reward”.
The present work analyzes the effects of workers’ identity in the public provision of
collective goods such as education, health, civil safety, social work, etc. We incorporate into
a principal-agent model, the possibility to influence public workers’ (agents) identity with
1See for instance, Sen [29], Wilson [31], Akerlof and Kranton [1, 2], Besley and Ghatak [8], Ghatak and
Mueller [17] and Prendergast [24, 25].
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the use of incentives. We assume that including some motivational investments in contracts,
public organisations may affect positively their employees’ identity.
Developing a sense of mission an organization may avoid “vague objectives” and will
define a set of accurate “critical tasks” or “operational goals”.
The “culture” of an organization is a way to see what these critical tasks are and
how to deal with them. Wilson (1989, 93)
A “mission” is a single culture that is widely and enthusiastically shared by the
members of the organization. Wilson (1989, 99)
In our model “mission” has to do with the associative benefits that come from being part
of an organization. “Mission” is a culture shared by all the members whithin organisation
and diminish the experienced disutility of making high effort at the workplace.
Bureaucrats have preferences. Among them is the desire to do the job. That
desire may spring entirely out of a sense of duty, or it may arise out of a willingness
to conform to the expectations of fellow workers and superiors even when there is no
inmediate financial advantage in doing so. Wilson (1989, 156).
Many of most productive firms have tried to substitute monetary incentives with the
culture of mission.
In business where one might suppose that money incentives are the whole story,
great efforts have been made by the most productive firms to supplement those incen-
tives with a sense of mission based on a shared organizational culture. Wilson (1989,
157).
Another branch of the literature related with the concept of identity is Corporate Culture
(CC). In a seminal work about CC Kreps [19], treats the corporate culture as a principle
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that helps to identify a firm’s rule of behavior which helps setting a good reputation that
cean be can be communicated to potential future trading partners and also can be avaluated
by them. Such a rule will be characterized by a principle of application. In words of D.M.
Kreps [19],
I wish to identitfy corporate culture with the principle and with the means by
which the principle is communicated. My understanding of corporate culture is that
it accomplishes just what the principle should − it gives hierarchical inferiors an idea
ex ante how the organization will react to circumstances as they arise; in strong sense,
it gives identity to the organization.
Other relevant works from CC literature are: Barney [4], Schein [28], Crémer [11], Lazear
[20], Tirole [30], Carrillo and Gromb [9, 10], Hermalin [18] and, Rob and Zemsky [27].
Identity is related with person’s self-image. How people think about themselves in
terms of social categories, and how people think that they and others should behave2. In a
organisation, identity, is the degree in which agents share organisational goals and objectives.
In the public provision of collective goods, identity is a measure of how accurately workers
identify themselves with the organisation mission of providing these social valuable goods.
Identity is the internalization of a culture by all the members of an organisation and culture
can be interpreted as the organisational goal or mission.
Identity in our model makes effort subjectively less costly to workers and therefore weak-
ens incentive constraint and helps to overcome moral-hazard. For a worker with identity,
exert high effort is the ideal way to behave given that she views herself as being part of the
organization.
Workers’ identity in organisations may be altered as a result of socialisation. Socialisa-
tion is the process through which organisations can change workers’ identity. Socialisation
acts making workers’ and organisation’s goals and objectives to be aligned. By contrast,
2See for instance Sen [29] and Akerlof and Kranton [1, 2]
5
conflict will be the process that lead workers to be completely disagree with organisational
goals or organisational mission. Socialisation can be launched by organisation’s managers
carrying out certain investments which serve as a signal of a general shared mission.
In general, less incentives are needed to elicit effort when organisation have workers with
identity. Thus we can consider the identity as another productive asset of the organization
in which the principal could invest. Then, we can measure what Akerlof and Kranton [1]
call as motivational capital : the current value of the stream of the expected costs saved by
the organisation when principal invests a given amount of resources to improve workers’
identity.
2 The Model
We want to analyze the optimality of contracts in a principal agent model in which the
principal may provoke changes in agents’ identity. We want to capture in the model whether
the possibility of changing agents’ identity may influence optimal incentive contracts. This
question has been neglected by standard Contract Theory, which traditionally assume that
economic agents are motivated only by material self-interest.
In the present section of the paper, first, we describe in a precise way the channel through
which changes in identity happen and, second, we incorporate this channel into the model.
Then, we define the game and finally we solve it and we make comparative statics to draw
some interesting results.
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2.1 Players’ Preferences and Utilities.
There are two players in the game: the agent Aand the principal P3. We assume that A
can develop identity. We also restrict the analysis to linear contracts.
We model a finite period t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... principal-agent dynamical game where the
agents’ effort is private information. Agents’ behaviour is affected by identity. We incorpo-
rate identity into A’s utility function. Identity is a non-monetary source of motivation that
affects agents’ preferences. Identity also can be altered or changed by principal’s choices.
2.1.1 Principal
First, assume that there is a performance measure qt that P wants to maximize in each
t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T, . . . . The principal may use monetary incentives −“carrots and sticks”− or
non-monetary incentives −“identity motivating”− to maximize qt or performance. We take
qt as a target outcome for P but it is not neccesarily the only one for A, or even should
be indirectly related to As’ mission. This condition of unrelatedness or disconnection may
what makes necessary the use of incentives.
Let Rt(qt) be a function which assigns a monetary value to the performance level4. Rt(qt)
is positively correlated with the achieved social welfare, the total amount of the collective
good of service delivered, and the sort of measures which are salient and observable by the
electorate, tax payers and political advisors to evaluate the public supply of collective goods.
Performance qt is a function of As’ effort et ∈ {e, e}. Assume that qt ∈ {q, q} where
q > q; interpret q as P ’s target on performance level and q as a fail in this target. Let
3Often we use she and he to refer to the agent and the principal respectively, as conventionally the
principal agent literature does.
4Usually for the firm this monetary value is determined by the market price and the quantity sold. But
in the case of the public provision of collective goods the absence of markets and market prices makes hard
to measure the monetary value of qt. We can interpret this function as one which calculate the opportunity
cost of public supplying rather than market supplying
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p(qt = q|et) = θi be the probability of high performance conditional to A’s effort choice.
We use i = 0, 1 to label low and high effort: 0 means low effort e and 1 means high effort
e. Then p(qt = q|et = e) = θ1 will be the probability of high performance when the agent
decides to exert high effort, and p(qt = q|et = e) = θ0 the probability of high performance
when the agent decides to exert low effort. Alternatively p(qt = q|et = 1) = 1 − θ1 and
p(qt = q|et = e) = 1 − θ0 will be the probabilities of low performance when effort ishigh
and low respectively. We assume that performance qt is an informative but noisy signal of
et which means that θ1 > θ0.
Let E[Rt(qt)|θi] be the expected material rewards achieved by the principal that depends
on qt that is conditional to θi. Let wt(qt) be the monetary payments, contingent to per-
formance, offered by P to A. Then, E[wt(qt)|θi] will be the expected monetary payment
of A and the expected monetary cost for P at the same time. Let s0 be the total amount
of resources invested to promote and change A’s identity. We assume that P makes this
investment s0 at the starting period of the game t = 0. Such initial investment generates
a depreciation cost stream that we capture with the cost function Ct(s0). Thus we will be
able to write P ’s problem as the profit maximizing problem described below.
Then P ’s expected profit function pit for each period t can be written as,
Πt = E[Rt(qt)|θi]− E[wt(qt)|θi]− Ct(s0) (2.1)
Where the investment cost function Ct(s0) is such that, takes the value C0(S) = S in
t = 0 and an depreciation cost Ct(S) = γS for every t > 1 at constant depreciaton rate γ.
2.1.2 Agent
We represent the A’s preferences with the following expected utility function.
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Ut = E[ut(wt(qt))|θi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected utility from income
− ψt(et,
Identity︷ ︸︸ ︷
υt(s0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Disutility from effort
(2.2)
The first term on the right hand side of the above utility function, E[ut(wt(qt))|θi], is
the expected utility from money. The agent is risk averse, u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0, and the
parameter θi is the probability of high or low performance.
The second term on the right hand side of the expected utility function represents
the disutility from effort ψt(et, υt(s0)). The disutility from effort depends negatively on
υt(s0) which is a function representing A’s identity and depends positively from effort. The
properties of the disutility from effort are summed up in the following set of assumptions.
A1: The function ψt(et, υt(s0)) is continuous in the interval [υ, υ].
A2: The function ψt(et, υt(s0)) is strictly decreasing in its second argument
when et = e. That is, ∂ψt(e,υt)∂υt |et=e < 0.
A3: When et = e, then ψt(e, υt) = 0; ∀υt ∈ [υ, υ].
A4: The function ψt(et, υt(s0)) is bounded below and above. Is bounded below when ψt(e, υt) =
0 ∀υt, and ψt(e, υ) = 0. The function is bounded above when ψt(e, υ) = Ψ, with
Ψ ∈ R+.
The above assumptions ensure that, when identity converge to its upper (lower) bound,
then A’s disutility from doing high effort converges to zero (Ψ). That is, the agent does not
suffer disutility from exerting high effort when she develops identity. Contrary, when she
has no identity, A experiences the maximum disutility from effort and she only can diminish
this disutility making low effort.
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2.2 The Game
The game is a repeated game with two players, the agent A and the principal P . We
consider the game as a repeated dynamic recontracting game in which every period both
players have to make new choices: P must offer a new contract after updating his beliefs
about A’s identity. Then, A has to choose a new effort level. Thus, we analyze a repeated
principal agent game with moral hazard, where the choices made by the P affects A’s
identity. Reciprocally these changes in identity and motivation affect the contracts and
optimal choice of payments of P in the next period.
2.2.1 Information
At the first period of the game, P learns A’s type or identity5 probability distribution
F0(υ0). P ’s action over s0 affects the A’s identity and therefore P have to update the A’s
identity distribution Ft(υt|s0) in the subsequent of the periods of the game t = 1, ..., T, ...
where t ∈ N.
2.2.2 Timing
Each period the game consists of three stages: stage 0, stage 1, and stage 2. The sequence
of these stages in t = 0, 1, 2, ... is graphically shown in figure 1.
The sequence of stages within each period t = 0, 1, 2, ... is as described below:
(0): The principal P learns the distribution ofAs’ identity F0(υ0) in t = 0 or updatesAs’
identity distribution Ft(υt|s0) in t = 1, 2, ... conditional to the choice of s0 ∈ {0, S} in t = 0.
Then taking into acount the expected value of A’s identity, P offers a contract. The contract
will be a dupla of stochastic contingent payments w0(q0) = {w,w} joint with the choice to
5We consider a continuum of types of A, υt ∈ [υ, υ] There is a possibility of switching As’ type or identity
making an investment in the starting period of the game. For a precise description of the time evolution of
the conditional distribution of types see the mathematical appendix.
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Figure 1: The timing of the game in two separate squences, t = 0 and t = 1, 2, ...
invest or not in motivational capital s0 ∈ {0, S} in t = 0: {w0(q0), s0}. In t = 1, 2, . . .
the contract will also be a dupla of stochastic contingent payments w1(q1) = {w,w} joint
with the commitment of bearing the cost of depreciation of the s0 ∈ {0, S} investment or
Ct(s0) = γs0: {wt(qt), Ct(s0)}.
(1): A accepts or refuses the contract. If she accepts, then choose an action over effort
e0 ∈ {e, e}. Contrary, if she refuses then she gets her reservation utility U .
(2): Finally, output is realized qt ∈ {q, q}. Stochastic contingent payment is realized
wt(qt) = {w,w} and payoffs pit and Ut are realized.
2.2.3 Identity and Socialization
Agents only differ in their identity. For all of them, their skills and qualification for work is
the same. They are equally productive in the production of qt. Therefore, P only deals with
moral hazard because the differences in motivation degree does not involve any difference
in agents’ abilities in the production of q. A’s identity distribution is assumed to be known
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by P .
Incentives and contracts offered by the principal may change agent’s identity. Assume
that agent’s identity can take a value whithin some closed real interval υ ∈ [υ, υ], with
υ < υ and υ ∈ R+. Higher identity means lower disutility from effort. Thus, we can
anticipate that more identity needs less monetary incentives in order to overcome moral
hazard and incentivize high effort. However, if the principal does not make any investment
in motivational capital and only use monetary incentives to elicit high effort, he will need to
offer a higher amount money to A because she will experience more disutility from effort.
What we want to capture with the socialization process6 is P ’s ability to change agents’
identity carrying out investments in the organization which signal support and awareness
toward agents or workers. This behavior of P makes lead agents to share the organisation’s
goals. Thus if P chooses to invest s0 = S he will switch As’ identity to a higher level. But
if he decides not to invest, s0 = 0, then agents will switch to lower identity bringing all of
them to conflict.
2.2.4 Solving Principal’s Problem
Assume that A and P have to renegotiate contracts period after period. This assumption
turns the game into a dynamic re-contracting game. Then we solve the game implementing
the spot contract in each period of the game. In order to make the vector of the spot
contracts as the long term optimal solution we have to assume no availability to renegotiate
in the short term. In this game the only way to agree upon a contract is playing the repeated
game at every period t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... as a new game.
Then we can write the P ’s problem as follows,
6See Adler and Bryan [3]
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Max{wt(qt),s0}E[Rt(qt)|θi]− ·E[wt(qt)|θi]− Ct(s0) (2.3)
Subject to
E[ut(wt(qt)|θi)]− ψt(e, υt) > E[ut(wt(qt)|θi)]− ψt(e, υt) (ICC) (2.4)
E[ut(wt(qt)|θi)]− ψt(e, υt) > U (PC) (2.5)
ut(w) > 0 ⇐⇒ wt(q) > 0 ⇐⇒ h(ut(w)) > 0 (LLC) (2.6)
(4) is A’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICC), and ensures that the agent will prefer
to exert high effort. (5) is the A’s participation constraint (PC), and ensures that the agent
will prefer to participate and accept the contract. Finally, (6) is a limited liability constraint
(LLC), and ensures that the low payment never falls below zero level.
P ’s problem is solved, for each t. Solution in each period t consist in the following
payment function w(q) : q −→ w
w(q) =
{
w if q = q
w if q = q
where w > w7. We analyze in the next section, the conditions under which to make
investments in changing As’ identity is optimal for P . In the following we just show the
pair of payments which solves the spot contracting problem. Let h : u −→ w be the inverse
function of the utility function,
7How these contingent payments have been calculated is formally shown in the mathematical appendix,
section B.3
13
h(u) =
{
w if u = u
w if u = u
Applying the variable change w = h(u(w(q))) = (u(w(q)))−1 we have the following
payments,
wt = h(ut(w)) =
(
U +
(1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, υt(s0))
)−1
(2.7)
wt = h(ut(w)) =
(
U − θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, υt(s0))
)−1
. (2.8)
As it can be seen identity lowers w and raises w. A more precise and consistent relation
between identity and the money that the manager have to put in the pocket of the worker in
order to incentivize high effort requires to analyze how identity and the disutility from effort
interacts each with the other. Also we have to analyze how socialization affects workers’
identity and how these changes affects future stochastic contingent payments and by the
way the expected costs of incentivize effort.
P can not discriminate workers or agents attending their identity. P only knows the
distribution of identity. Then, he updates such distribution at every period taking into
account his own past actions and knowing how socialization works. Once P has updated
this information about As’ identity, he will be able to offer a contract based on the expected
identity of agents8. Thus, at every period of the game, P must offer a new pair of expected
payments conditioned to agents’ expected identity,
8This solution is suboptimal compared with the first best solution where effort level and identity are
perfectly observable. Also is more far away from the first best compared with in a stronger sense of the
second best solution where only the effort is unobservable but identity doesn’t play any role.
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wt(E[υt|s0]) =
(
U +
(1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, E[υt|s0])
)−1
(2.9)
wt(E[υt|s0]) =
(
U − θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, E[υt|s0])
)−1
. (2.10)
We write the Expected Cost Function for P at each t,
ECFt = (θ1wt(E[υt|s0]) + (1− θ1)wt(E[υt|s0])) + Ct(s0) (2.11)
Let us use the superscript s0 ∈ {0, S} in ECF s0t , in order to differentiate the expected
cost function when P invests in identity s0 = S, from the no-investment case s0 = 0. Then
we have ECF St and ECF 0t .
ECF 0t = (θ1wt(E[υt|0]) + (1− θ1)wt(E[υt|0]))
ECF St = (θ1wt(E[υt|S]) + (1− θ1)wt(E[υt|S])) + ct(S)
Identity can be considered another productive asset of the organization. Another kind
of capital of the organization that we call Motivational Capital. Then we can measure the
return of such investment in Motivational Capital computing the present value of the stream
of the expected costs saved by the health organization. This return can be measured with
the following mathematical expression,
CNV mk =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
ECF 0t − ECF St
]
(2.12)
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Where, δt =
(
1
1+r
)t is the discount factor, and r is the discount rate. We say that the
principal has incentives to invest in motivational capital when CNV mk > 0 and we say that,
there is no incentive to invest in motivational capital when CNV mk < 0.
3 Results
Now we calculate using equilibrium payments the spot contract’s cost, the organisation
profits and agents utilities for every t = 0, 1, ..., T, .... We solve the model for the case in
which P decides to invest in motivational capital and change identity of As s0 = S and for
the case in which P decides to not invest in motivational capital at all s0 = 0. We calculate
the solution for each case. In the last subsection we make comparative statics and derive
necessary and sufficient conditions for investing in motivational capital. We also discuss on
some conclusions.
3.1 Shifting Agents Toward identity: Investment in Motivational Capital
We will study the case in which the principal chooses to invest in motivational capital
s0 = S. In this case spot payments for every t are,
wSt (Et[υt|S]) = h
(
U +
(1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|S])
)
(3.1)
wSt (Et[υt|S]) = h
(
U − θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|S])
)
(3.2)
For the starting period t = 0 payments will be,
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wt(E0[υ0]) = h
(
U +
(1− θ0)
∆θ
ψ0(e, E0[υ0])
)
(3.3)
wt(E0[υ0]) = h
(
U − θ0
∆θ
ψ0(e, E0[υ0])
)
(3.4)
These two payments of t = 0 will be exactly the same for the case in which P does not
invest any amount in motivational capital because at the starting period of the game the
socialization effect can not have occurred yet. For the case of s0 = S we write the following
expected cost function for health manager,
ECF St = θ1w
S
t (Et[υt|S]) + (1− θ1)wSt (Et[υt|S]) + Ct(S). (3.5)
Now we can calculate the spot expected profit ΠSt for P and the spot expected utility
USt for A given that the latter chooses et = e and therefore the probability to achieve qt = q
outcome is θ1.
ΠSt = Et[Rt(qt)|θ1]− [ECF St ] (3.6)
USt = θ1
(
U + (1−θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|S])
)
+(1− θ1)
(
U − θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|S])
)
− ψt
(
et, υt(s0)
)
(3.7)
Finally, we compute the present value of the sum of spot profits and the sum of the spot
utilities, and also the expression which measures the present value of the total surplus TSS
when P action is s0 = S.
ΓS =
T∑
t=0
δtΠSt =
T∑
t=0
δt
(
Et[Rt(qt)|θ1]− [ECF St ]
)
(3.8)
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TUS =
T∑
t=0
δtEt[USt |θ1] =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
θ1
(
U +
(1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|S])
)]
+
T∑
t=0
δt
[
(1− θ1)
(
U − θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|S])
)
− ψt(e, υt(S)
]
(3.9)
TSS =
T∑
t=0
δt
(
Et[USt |θ1] + Et[piSt |θ1]
)
(3.10)
3.2 Agents in Conflict: No-investment in Motivational Capital
In this section we analyze the no investment case or s0 = 0. In this case P does not invest
any amount of resources to promote A’s identity. The mere use of monetary incentives
to control As’ behavior put agents into conflict toward organization. For this case spot
payments are,
w0t (Et[υt|0]) = h
(
U +
(1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|0])
)
(3.11)
w0t (Et[υt|0]) = h
(
U − θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|0])
)
(3.12)
Payments in t = 0 are exactly the same as those described in the previous subsection.
We write the expected cost function for this incentive policy in every t = 0, 1, ..., T, ..., that
we call ECF 0t .
ECF 0t = θ1w
0
t (Et[υt|0]) + (1− θ1)w0t (Et[υt|0]) (3.13)
Now we can calculate the spot expected profit Π0t for P and the spot expected utility
U0t for A, given the agent choice et = e and probability θ1.
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Π0t = Et[Rt(qt)|θ1]− ECF 0t (3.14)
U0t = θ1
(
U +
(1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|0])
)
+ (1− θ1)
(
U − θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|0])
)
− ψt(e, υt(0))
(3.15)
Also for this case we complete the results showing the present value of the sum of spot
profits and the sum of the spot utilities, and also the expresion which measures the present
value of the social welfare TS0 under the incentive policy s0 = 0.
Γ0 =
T∑
t=0
δtEt[Π
0
t |θ1] =
T∑
t=0
δt
(
Et[Rt(qt)|θ1]− [ECF 0t ]
)
(3.16)
TU0 =
T∑
t=0
δtEt[U0t |θ1] =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
θ1
(
U +
(1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|0])
)]
+
T∑
t=0
δt
[
(1− θ1)
(
U − θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|0])
)
− ψt(et, υt(0))
]
(3.17)
TS0 =
T∑
t=0
δt
[U0t + Π0t ] (3.18)
3.3 Comparative statics
Our model shows that an agent with identity whithin the firm or public organisation is
willing to work hard at a high effort for a lower overall pay. This means that less variation
in payment schedule is required to incentivize high effort. This less variation in payments
results in additional cost savings for P . In addition, when agents are risk averse, less
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variation in payments means that they must be compensated with a lower risk premiun and
this constitutes another cost saving source for the organization management. When these
cost advantages are high enough, it can be worthwhile for P to undertake a costly program
to promote agents’ identity.
Comparative statics of our model establish under which conditions agents’ identity lead
the organization to find profitable to invest in promoting identity among workers. If incul-
cating identity is cheap, if output and agents’ effort are weakly correlated (effort is hard to
observe an hard to reward), if agents are especially risk averse, if high effort is critical to the
organization’s output, then the use of an identity-oriented motivational incentive scheme,
would be more profitable and more likely to be used.
3.3.1 Identity and Motivational Capital
One very first result that it is straightforward to set, comes from the comparison between
the current value of the sum of spot profits for P when he takes S action and when he takes
0 action. That is, firstly calculating the Current Net Value of the A’s motivational capital
(CNV mk), and then checking if it is positive or negative.This first result is formally shown
in proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Let T the number of periods of the game. For a given δ large enough, and
given γ small enough, there exists a threshold t∗ such that,
∑t∗
t=0 δ
t
[
θ1(w
0
t −wSt ) + (1− θ1)(w0t −wSt )
]
=
∑t∗
t=0 δ
tCt(S)
and for which
i. If t∗ 6 T then CNV mk > 0 and P finds profitable to invest in motivational capital
and choose the s0 = S strategy.
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ii. If t∗ > T then CNV mk < 0 and P finds profitable not to invest in motivational capital
and choose the s0 = 0 strategy.
Figure 4 shows graphically this first result. The graph on the left side of the figure 4
shows jointly as a function of time t, either, P ’s expected cost function in the case of s0 = 0
and P ’s expected cost function in the case of s0 = S. The discounted sum of the difference
between these two functions will be the measure of the current net value perceived by P
from an investment in motivational capital. In the graph two different cases − (i) and (ii) −
are shown with the goal of being illustrative of the proposition 1 results.
Figure 2: Current Net Value of the Motivational Capital.
The graph on the right side of the figure 4 shows the value of the CNV mk as a function
of time t. In this graph also two cases are shown in the other graph. The t∗ threshold
determines the critical point below which the best strategy for P will be not to invest.
The motivational capital profitability threshold t∗ is the key variable for P ’s optimal
action choice. This threshold depens on several variables. The relations given between
these variables and the motivational capital profitability threshold is what determines P ’s
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optimal decision in this contracting game. We will focus on the analysis of these relations
in order to draw conditions under which one or another strategy, s0 ∈ {0, S} is optimal.
Now let us compare the total surplus of each strategy s0 ∈ {0, S} of P , to analyze the
cases in which all the members whithin an organisation are better off. What we summarise
in the following proposition is that the social optimum coincides with the optimal choice of
P . This is the case despite the socialization or conflict effects of incentive policies. It is so
because incentive compatibility constraint (2) and participation constraint (3) ensure that
for every choice s0 ∈ {0, S} of P , and for every t = 0, 1, . . . , T the expected utility required
by A to exert high effort is the same. Depending on the P ’s choice over s0 ∈ 0, S the only
diffenrence in the expected utility experienced by A is the source through this utility comes
−monetary or identity− while the total of this expected utility remains constant.
Related to Proposition 1, we have the following result:
Proposition 2. Let CNV mk = TSS − TS0 = ∑Tt=0 δt [EC0t − ECSt ]. Let (s0, et) be the
strategy profile that solves the game.
i. If CNV mk > 0, then (S, e) is a Pareto-Efficient strategy profile and Pareto-Dominates
(0, e). Therefore investing in Motivational Capital, s0 = S, is the optimal social choice.
ii. If CNV mk < 0, then (0, e) is a Pareto Efficient strategy profile and Pareto Dominates
(S, e). Therefore not investing in Motivational Capital, s0 = 0 is the optimal social
choice.
3.3.2 Investment Depreciation Pace and Motivational Capital
Another interesting insight that we can draw from the solution of the game relates the
kind of the investment that the principal has to run and the profitability threshold t∗.
In other words, motivational investments that have higher depreciation rates are highly
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expensive in relation with the costs that the principal can save from having workers with
identity. Therefore these high depreciation cost featured investments will be less likely to
be implemented. In the case of high depreciation of motivational investments, the returns
for P may be either; small and will require a very high number of periods to turn profitable,
or negative and never will turn profitable.
For the latter we can establish that there is a maximun depreciation rate γ above of
which the Current Net Value of motivational capital never will reach a positive value and
investing in motivational capital will not be profitable at all. Proposition 3 summarize this
result.
Proposition 3. Assume that all the agents whithin the organization have reached the upper
value of identity υt = υ at any given time period t = tˆ. Taking S as constant, if γS >[
θ1
(
w0
tˆ
− wS
tˆ
)
+ (1− θ1)
(
w0
tˆ
− wS
tˆ
)]
, then CNV mk < 0 and decreasing for all t = 1, 2, ...
and P never will find profitable to invest in motivational capital.
Figure 3: Negative Current Net Value of the Motivational Capital, CNV mk < 0 due to high cost
of depreciation γS.
The intutition behind proposition 3 as shown in the figure 3 is as follows: whenever
As’ identity is not large enough to cause an advantage in payments which offset the cost of
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promoting identity
(
E[w0t − wSt |θ1] < Ct(S)
)
, at any time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T, . . . , then there
is no reason to spend resources to change workers’ identity neither, in the short run nor in
the long run.
The analogous case in which identity is large enough to overcome the cost of generating
it
(
E
[
w0t′ − wSt′ |θ1
]
> Ct′(S)
)
, at some time period t = t′, and t′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . } is more of
our interest. In this case organisation’s expected saving in payments due to agents’ identity
when P ’s choice is s0 = S is strictly increasing and bounded. Taken together with the
assumption of a constant depreciation cost, γS we have that the optimlity of investing in
motivational capital becomes a matter of time. Then the time that the organisation has to
wait in order to get profits from identity changes, CNV mk > 0, will be a function of the
depreciation rate value γ. Proposition 4 shows such a relation.
Proposition 4. Let i ∈ {l, h} be two alterantive ways of changing agents’ identity with γl
and γh two different depreciation costs such that γl < γh. Let t = t′i, t′i ∈ {0, 1, . . . } be the
time periods in which the change in agents’ identity reach a value such that E
[
w0t′i
− wSt′i |θ1
]
>
γiS. Let t = t∗i , t∗i ∈ {0, 1, . . . } be the number of time periods in which CNV mki = 0. Then
t′l < t
′
h and t∗l < t∗h.
Figure 4 illustrates the result of the proposition 4. The intutition behind this proposition
is as follows: think in situations in which investing in motivational capital through changing
identity have a potential to be profitable. Then, those actions which require of investments
with higher depreciation costs will turn profitable in more long time horizons. In other
words, although investment in motivational capital is an optimal long run strategy, when the
change in agents’ identity requires more resources (obstinate agents, distrustful agents,. . . )
the principal must be more patient or should has the security of maintaining workers with
enough long contracts.
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Figure 4: Current Net Value of Motivational Capital with two different depreciation rates γl and
γh such that γl < γh.
Other way of looking at this problem is that, in organizations with high rotation rates
investing in motivational capital is less likely to be an optimal strategy unless the change
in identity could be achieved by promoting work stability for instance.
3.3.3 Effort Effectiveness and Motivational Capital
The model captures A’s effort effectiveness degree with the θi ∈ [0, 1] parameter, where
i = 0, 1 mean respectively A’s low effort action and high effort action. θi can be interpreted
as the probability of high performance conditional to A’s effort choice. We say that θi is
informative if θ1 > θ0. When the value of θ0 is closer to θ1 P must offer higher incentives
to incentivize A to exert high effort.
Previous findings establish that pure monetary incentives results too expensive when
the signal used to link payments and effort is hard to observe. In such cases, investing in
motivational capital through changing agents’ identity, s0 = S, will be the optimal choice for
P because effort is hard to observe and hard to reward. This is because although investing
in motivational capital is costly Ct(S), P will reduce payment costs because workers with
identity do not need as higher monetary incentives to exert high effort as workers without
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identity. Higher θ0 implies higher monetary incentives, then potential savings from s0 = S
strategy will be very high if it is the case and then investing in motivational capital becomes
more likely to be optimal because the current net value, CNV mk becomes positive earlier.
Proposition 5 summarizes the above result:
Proposition 5. Let p(q = q|e = e) = θ′0 and p(q = q|e = e) = θ′′0 be two alternative
probabilities of high performance when A’s effort is low such that θ′0 > θ′′0 . Let CNV mkθ′0 and
CNV mk
θ
′′
0
be the current net value of investing in motivational capital in the cases of θ′0 and
θ
′′
0 respectively. Let t∗θ′0
and t∗
θ
′′
0
be the threshold number of periods such that their respective
current net values of investing in motivational capital, CNV mk
θ
′
0
and CNV mk
θ
′′
0
become positive.
For θ′0, θ
′′
0 ∈ [0, 1] such that θ′0 > θ′′0 , then CNV mkθ′0 > CNV
mk
θ
′′
0
and therefore t∗
θ
′
0
< t∗
θ
′′
0
.
Proposition 5 shows that as higher is the probability of achieving high performance
when the effort is low, p(q = q|e = e) = θ0, then more profitable will be for P to invest in
motivational capital s0 = S.9
3.3.4 Agents’ Risk Aversion and Motivational Capital
In the model, agents are risk-averse with respect to their monetary earnings. They per-
ceive utility from Incentives which consists in contingent rewards linked to performance qt.
But agents also experience utility from identity and as mean as agent identity raises, fewer
incentives are required in order to encourage him to exert high effort. Less variation in pay-
ments indicates that A can be compensated with a lower risk premium, and this constitutes
another cost-saving source for the organisation.
Proposition 6 formally states that investing in motivational capital is more profitable in
the presence of risk-averse A:
9This result is consistent with what Akerlof and Kranton (2005) state about identity as an incentive for
work motivation. [. . . ] a change in identity is the ideal motivator if, [. . . ] the effort of a worker is either
hard to observe or hard to reward.(p. 10)
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Proposition 6. Let A1 and A2 be a pair of agents with υ1 and υ2 identity respectively.
If agents are risk-averse and υ1 < υ2, then the risk premium will be lower in the case of
A2 than in the case of A1. Therefore t∗1 > t∗2 and organisations will find more profitable to
invest in motivational capital when agents are more risk averse.
The intuition behind this result is that incentives must be greater in ordert to encourage
high effort from agents without identity. Higher incentives required by lower identity raise
the range between the low w and the high w payments. Given that A is risk averse, the
risk premium that P should offer to make the incentive contract attractive for A will result
higher. Analogously, agents with identity will require fewer incentives to exert high effort.
Consequently, an agent with high identity has to bear a lower variance over payments and
has to be compensated with a lower risk premium. The decrease in the risk premium thus
involves an additional source of savings for P that can be exploited by managing changes
in the As’ identity.
4 Conclusion
We introduce the notion of identity in a model of principal agent with moral hazard. Incen-
tives beyond the money can be an alternative option to money incentivization for encourage
agents to exert high effort. The incorporation of identity has been done on the basis of an
extense literature on identity10. Our approach has to do with what Fehr et al. [16] summed
up with the following quote:
[...] This approach is a first step to developing richer models that may become
part of “behavioral contract theory.”
Introducing the notion of identity in a principal agent model joint with the ability of
the principal to manage agents’ identity and align their goals with their own, the present
10See for instance Akerlof and Kranton [?, 1, 2] and Benabou and Tirole [6].
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work has shown the conditions under which to spend resources to change agents’ identity is
profitable for organisations.
These conditions are, for instance, the lenght of the contracts offered, the total cost of
investing in changing agents’ identity for the principal, the informative value of the signal
used to observe and incentivize effort, the degree of agents’ risk aversion.
Taking all into account, what we conclude from this work is: an initial investment in mo-
tivational capital using incentives beyond the money though costly at inception, will result
more effective to control public organisations expenditure. Then, Governments, political
advisors and public organisations should take into account and incorporate these findings
to the policy design. For instance, from the proposition 1 a planner could conclude that
monetary incentives are the best way to achieve a specifical goal in the short term. However
for the long term goals: quality, efficiency, effectivenes, research and develop results, then
proposition 1 establishes, that a change in identity and investments in motivational capital
is the most profitable action for the organisation.
Finally, wherever the principal in the public organisation is politically designed, their
time horizon will be the legislative time period and then it is more likely that they are
focused in the short term goals. Thus, they will have a willingness to chosse pure monetary
rewards as incentive schemes, despite in the long term the best choice is the investment in
motivational capital given that workers’ contracts are much longer that legislative piece of
time. Anyway these conclusions are interesting future research questions which, should be
tested and studied in depth in the future.
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A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Socialization: the Evolution of Identity Distribution.
Let F (υt|s0) be the probability distribution function of the As’ identity υt, where υt ∈ [υ, υ],
υ < υ and υ, υ ∈ R+.
Assume that for any decision choice of s0, F0(υ0|S) = F0(υ0|0) = F0(υ0). Socialization
will reflect evolution of identity distribution through time, conditional to the choice of s0.
We separate the socialization into two cases: socialization and conflict. The distribution
of identity will evolve oppositely depending on the P ’s s0 investement strategy.
Thus for every value of υt = υ∗ when s0 = 0 the distribution function at any period
t is stochastically dominated by the distribution function of the previous period t − 1.
Alternatively for every value of υt when s0 = S the distribution function at any period t
dominates stochastically the distribution function of the previous period t−1. This property
is formally written as follows,
Ft(υt = υ
∗|0) > Ft−1(υt−1 = υ∗|0) > · · · > F0(υ0)
> · · · > Ft−1(υt−1 = υ∗|S) > Ft(υt = υ∗|S)
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Figure 5: Identity. Stochastic Dominance.
Figure 6: Identity. Time Evolution of Densities.
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Finally assume that Ft(υt|S) converges to put all the probability on the upper bound of
the identity υt = υ, and Ft(υt|0) converges to put all the probability on the lower bound of
the identity υt = υ.
lim
t→∞
Ft(υt|S) = λ where λ =
{
1 if υ = υ
0 otherwise
and
lim
t→∞
Ft(υt|0) = 1, for every υ ∈ [υ, υ].
Let Et[υt|s0] be the mathematical expectation in t of the value of υt conditional to the
incentive policy s0. Implications of the s0 conditioned stochastic dominance on Et[υt|s0]:
∀t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... Et[υt+1|0] < Et[υt|0]
∀t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... Et+1[υt+1|S] > Et[υt|S]
∀t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... Et[υt|0] < Et[υt|S]
Where,
Et[υt|s0] =
∫ υ
υ
υtf(υt|s0)dυt
A.2 Problem Solving
Let us now to simplify the notation in order to make algebraic operations easier. We relabel
some variables of the model in order to do that. All changes are summarized in table 1.
Then we can rewrite the P ’s problem as follows:
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Utility from monetary payments: ut(w) = u ; ut(w) = u
Disutility from effort: ψt(e, υt(s0)) = ψt
Intrinsic motivation φt(∆wt,m(st)) = φt
P ’s revenue function: Rt(q) = R ; Rt(q) = R
Change of variables: w = h(u) ; w = h(u)
Probability variation: ∆θ = (θ1 − θ0)
Reservation utility: U
Table 1: Notational simplification
Max{wt(qt),s0}θ1
(
R− h(u))− (1− θ1) (R− h(u))− st (A.1)
Subject to
θ1u+ (1− θ1)u− ψt + φt > θ0u+ (1− θ0)u+ φt (ICC) (A.2)
θ1u+ (1− θ1)u− ψt + φt > U (PC) (A.3)
Note that the P ’s objective function is now strictly concave in u and u, because h(·) is
strictly convex. The function u−1 = h(u) gives back ex post the monetary payments from
utility levels. We have now linear constraints and a nonempty interior of the constrained
set and therefore the problem is concave and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are sufficient and
necessary for characterizing optimality.
Letting λ and µ be the non-negative multipliers associated respectively with the (ICC)
and (PC) constraints. First-order conditions of this problem yield:
1
u′(w)
= µ+ λ
∆θ
θ1
(A.4)
1
u′(w)
= µ− λ ∆θ
1− θ1 (A.5)
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The equations (9) and (10) jointly with (6) and (7) form a system of four equations with
four variables (w,w, µ, λ) which allows us to calculate the solution. Multiplying (9) by θ1
and (10) by (1− θ1) and adding those two modified equations, we obtain,
µ =
θ1
u′(w)
+
1− θ1
u′(w)
> 0 (A.6)
Hence, µ > 0 and the participation constraint (7) is binding. Using (11) and (9), we
also obtain,
λ =
(1− θ1)θ1
∆θ
(
1
u′(w)
− 1
u′(w)
)
> 0 (A.7)
And the incentive compatibility constraint (6) is also binding. Thus we can obtain
immediately the values of u(w) and u(w) by solving a system with two equations and two
unknowns. The result is shown below,
ut(w) = U − φt (Ωt,m(s0)) + (1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, υt(s0)) (A.8)
ut(w) = U − φt (Ωt,m(s0))− θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, υt(s0)). (A.9)
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof available from the authors upon request.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof available from the authors upon request.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof available from the authors upon request.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof available from the authors upon request.
A.7 Effort effectiveness: some analysis on θi.
Preliminary assumptions over θi:
P (qt = q|et = e) = θ1 P (qt = q|et = e) = θ0
P (qt = q|et = e) = 1− θ1 P (qt = q|et = e) = 1− θ0
Assume also that performance is an informative signal about effort, θ1 > θ0. Further,
results show that in any case, benchmark case or standard economic model, investment in
motivational capital, and no-investment in motivational capital, the stochastic parameter
θi only affects the stochastic payments w˜t(q˜t).
Let us to take the standard model’s stochastic payments w˜t as start point. We analyze
the impact of θ0 on both, w = h
(
U − θ0
θ1−θ0 Ψ
)
and w = h
(
U + 1−θ0
θ1−θ0 Ψ
)
. By definition
h′(·) > 0 and h′′(·) > 0
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dw(q)
dθ0
= h′(u)
∂
(
U − θ0
θ1−θ0 Ψ
)
∂θ0
= −h′(u)
[ Ψθ1
(θ1 − θ0)2
]
< 0
The sign of this first derivative of h(u(w)) from θ0 is negative for any value θ0 ∈ [0, θ1].
Then the low stochastic payment depends negatively from θ0
Now we calculate the second derivative of w from θ0,
d2w(q)
dθ20
=
[
− h′′(u) ·
( Ψθ1
(θ1 − θ0)2
)2]
+ [−h′(u)] ·
( 2Ψθ1
(θ1 − θ0)3
)
< 0
The second derivative is negative. Then, the value of the utility experienced from the low
payment, decreases more quickly on θ0 as mean as the latter increases. Is straightforward
to se that in the limit the low payment w converges to −∞ when θ0 goes to θ1
lim
θ0→θ1
h
(
U − θ0Ψ
θ1 − θ0
)
= −∞
On the other hand, the first derivative on θ0 of the high payment is as follows,
dw(q)
dθ0
= h′(u) · ∂u(w(q))
∂θ0
= h′(u) ·
∂
(
U + (1−θ0)Ψ
θ1−θ0
)
∂θ0
= h′(u) ·Ψ (1− θ1)
(θ1 − θ0)2 > 0
The sign of the first derivative in the case of high payment, is possitive. Then, as mean as
the value of θ0 increases, the high payment also increases. The sign of the second derivative
show whether the payment increases faster or slower as mean as θ0 increases.
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Figure 7: Payments and the informative value of the signal
d2w(q)
dθ20
=
[
h′′(u) ·
∂
(
U+
(1−θ0)Ψ
θ1−θ0
)
∂θ0
]
·
(
Ψ (1−θ1)
(θ1−θ0)2
)
+
[
h′(u) · 2Ψ
(θ1−θ1)3
]
=
= h′′(u) ·
(
Ψ (1−θ1)
(θ1−θ0)2
)2
+ h′(u) · 2Ψ
(θ1−θ1)3 > 0
Is straightforward to see that the high payment is increasing in θ0 and this positive
relation is also increasing in θ0. Then, when θ0 value converges to θ1, the high stochastic
optimal payment converges to ∞.
lim
θ0→θ1
h
(
U +
(1− θ0)Ψ
θ1 − θ0
)
=∞
Figure
Finally we analyze how Ω = w − w evolves with the informative value of the signal.
That is, how the informative value of the signal, ∆θ = θ1 − θ0 affects the range and the
amount of the incentives. As it is shown, as more close to θ1 is θ0, then lower will be w and
higher will be w, and therefore Ω = ∆w must be greater. Analogously, as more separate is
θ0 from θ1, then higher will be w, lower will be w, and therefore Ω = ∆w must be lower. In
conclusion, signal informativeness makes monetary incentives less necessary.
Now, assume that intrinsic motivation and identity plays a role in the agent behaviour.
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Then, as it is shown in the section 3.2.4. of this paper, the problem solving payments are,
w = h(u(w)) = h
(
U +
(1− θ0)
∆θ
ψ(e, υ(s0))
)
w = h(u(w)) = h
(
U − θ0
∆θ
ψ(e, υ(s0))
)
.
Higher identity means more alignment between organizational or P ’s goals and A’s goals.
In the model more identity means that A experience a lower disutility from effort, which
will be zero in the limit when agent achieve full identity.
ψt(e, υ) = 0 (A.10)
Thus, the incentives to elicit A to exert effort will not depend on the effectiveness of the
signal θi because the agent will choose e = e action in every t due to his high identity and
thus to link higher expected payments to the choice of e = e action is not necessary.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof available from the authors upon request.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof available from the authors upon request.
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